Implementing a Real Name Financial Transaction System to Increase Transparency and Reduce Corruption by Won Hyuk Lim
1Implementing a Real-
Name Financial 
Transaction System to 
Increase Transparency 
and Reduce Corruption
CASE STUDY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 1
Introduction  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 2
Delivery Challenge   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 3
Implementation  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 4
Conclusion and Lessons Learned  .  .  .  .  . 7
References  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 8
PROJECT DATA
PARTNER ORGANIZATION:
KDI School of Public Policy & Management
ORGANIZATION TYPE:
Academic
DELIVERY CHALLENGES:
Basic Infrastructure: ICT;
Commitment & Leadership:  
Opposition or Lack of Consensus
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE:
Combatting corruption and tax evasion 
fostered by a lack of transparency 
SECTOR:
Finance
COUNTRY:
Republic of Korea
REGION:
East Asia
PROJECT DURATION:
1982–1993
CONTACTS
CASE AUTHOR:
Wonhyuk Lim
PROJECT EXPERT:
Soogil Young
March 2019
REPUBLIC
OF KOREA
Executive Summary
A real-name financial transaction system (RNFTS) requires that the real name 
of an individual or a legal entity be used in financial transactions, subject to 
verification by some form of identification. By enhancing the integrity and 
transparency of financial transactions, RNFTS aims to address the development 
challenge of reducing corruption and promoting fair taxation. Introducing 
RNFTS entails basically two types of delivery challenges: technical and political 
economy. The technical challenge has to do with setting up data infrastructure 
and dealing with verification and transition problems while safeguarding 
financial privacy. The political economy challenge has to do with overcoming the 
resistance of those who wanted to keep financial transactions secret. 
Since the early 1980s, successive governments in Korea acknowledged the 
imperative of financial transparency and integrity, but their commitment to 
implement the requisite reform fluctuated depending on political and economic 
conditions. In fact, although technical challenges associated with RNFTS had 
been largely addressed by the mid-1980s, political economy issues prevented its 
implementation until 1993. 
Introducing RNFTS is generally regarded as a case of concentrated costs and 
dispersed benefits, where reform-minded citizens must play entrepreneurial 
politics to mobilize the support of the general public to overcome the resistance 
of the powerful vested interest. However, under certain conditions, it may more 
resemble a case of concentrated costs and concentrated benefits, where a few 
Real Name Financial Transaction SystemGLOBAL DELIVERY INITIATIVE
2
reformers derive a disproportionate share of benefits 
against their political rivals. In Korea’s case, the payoff 
structure associated with RNFTS seems to have gone 
through this shift from the 1980s to 1993.1
Introduction
A real-name financial transaction system (RNFTS) 
requires that the real name of an individual or a legal entity 
(e.g., corporation) be used in financial transactions, subject 
to verification by some form of identification, instead of 
being anonymous or using a fictitious, borrowed, or stolen 
name.2 By enhancing the integrity and transparency of 
financial transactions, RNFTS aims to reduce corruption 
and promote fair taxation. However, introducing RNFTS 
entails significant technical and political economy 
challenges: Not only does it require a substantial amount 
of resources to set up data infrastructure and deal with 
verification and transition problems while safeguarding 
privacy, but also it must cope with resistance from those 
with a vested interest in keeping financial transactions 
secret. This case study presents how Korea overcame 
these technical and political economy challenges by 
examining three attempts to introduce RNFTS in 1982, 
1988–1990, and 1993.3
Context
Korea had achieved rapid growth from the early 1960s 
through export-oriented industrialization and human 
resource development. However, its economic system, 
based on close business-government relations, lacked 
transparency and raised questions about fairness. In 
particular, after large family-based business groups (known 
as the chaebol) benefited a great deal from generous policy 
loans and tax incentives during the heavy and chemical 
drive (1973–1979), popular demand for economic justice 
was such that a new military government introduced the 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act in 1980. 
Development Challenge
To reform-minded citizens, one of the most important 
development challenges for Korea in the 1980s was 
eradicating corruption and tax evasion fostered by a 
lack of transparency in financial transactions. Non-real-
name financial transactions made it easy for politicians 
to demand hidden payments from business people in 
exchange for some favors. Business people, in turn, 
could use bribes to engage in rent seeking rather than 
pursue productive activities. Non-real-name financial 
transactions also facilitated tax evasion. The government 
had in place standard legal provisions against corruption 
and tax evasion but lacked the financial data infrastructure 
to make them fully effective. Financial transparency 
seemed to represent the mother of all reforms: Without 
financial transparency, not only would it be impossible to 
eradicate corruption and tax evasion, but it would also 
be difficult to address problems associated with income 
and wealth inequality, because reliable financial data 
could not be collected with regard to income and wealth 
distribution.4 Reform-minded citizens saw financial 
transparency as key to a healthy democratic market 
economy and called for the introduction of a real-name 
financial transaction system. 
Since the early 1980s, successive governments in 
Korea acknowledged the imperative of this development 
challenge, but their commitment to implement the 
requisite reform fluctuated depending on political 
and economic conditions. In fact, although technical 
challenges associated with the implementation of the 
RNFTS had been largely addressed by the mid-1980s, it 
was not until 1993 that the RNFTS was implemented. This 
delay was due mainly to political economy challenges. 
1 For a more detailed analysis on this point, see Wonhyuk Lim, “Real Name 
Financial Transaction System: Three Attempts and Three Reversals,” in Case 
Studies on Korea’s Economic Reform, ed. by Jongryn Mo et al. (Seoul: Orum, 2002), 
pp.383–426 [in Korean].
2 Even if a financial account is held under a non-real name, proving true ownership 
may not be a serious problem as long as the real owner and the financial 
institution involved have an implicit agreement based on their relationship. 
However, borrowed name transactions may pose a particular challenge for 
verification. Suppose that individuals A and B agree to hold A’s money in 
B’s financial account for tax or other purposes. B would use his or her own 
identification card to conduct financial transactions on A’s behalf, and A would 
provide a side payment to B for this arrangement. In this case, it would be difficult 
for financial institutions and government authorities to figure out that money in 
B’s financial account really belongs to A only by looking at B’s identity card. Even 
though the financial account is actually under a borrowed name, they are likely to 
classify it as a real name account. In order to separate actual real name financial 
transactions from borrowed name transactions, the government could introduce 
measures to increase the potential for conflict between individuals A and B. For 
instance, in the previous example, if the court recognizes B as the lawful owner of 
the financial asset regardless of the side agreement and places the burden of proof 
on A, then B would have a greater incentive to betray A, who, in turn, would have 
a less incentive to engage in borrowed name transactions.
3 For more detail, see Lim (2002) and Woochan Kim, Korea’s Experience of 
Introducing the Real-Name Financial Transactions System (Sejong and Seoul: 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance and Korea University, 2015).
4 See, for instance, Baek, Yongho et al., Real Name Financial Transaction 
System (Seoul: Bibong Press, 1993) [in Korean]. This book was published by 
Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), a leading non-governmental 
organization in the early 1990s, which called for economic reform on a wide 
range of issues.
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Delivery Challenge
A real-name financial transaction system requires 
that the real name of an individual or a legal entity be 
used in financial transactions, subject to verification 
by some form of identification. It entails two types of 
delivery challenges: technical and political economy. 
The technical challenge has to do with setting up data 
infrastructure and dealing with verification and transition 
problems while safeguarding financial privacy—what the 
GDI taxonomy would classify as challenges associated 
with basic infrastructure: ICT. The political economy 
challenge has to do with overcoming the resistance of 
those seeking to keep financial transactions secret—a 
challenge that would fall under the taxonomic area of 
Commitment and Leadership: Opposition or Lack of 
Consensus.
The technical challenge, in turn, can be broken into 
four main tasks:5
1. Setting up identification systems for individuals and 
legal entities. To verify the identity of an individual or 
a legal entity engaged in a financial transaction, a na-
tional identification system must be in place. For each 
individual, such a system should use basic personal 
and residence information, as well as biometric data, 
to assign a unique digital identity number and issue an 
identification card.6 A similar system must be set up for 
legal entities based on their registration information. 
These identification systems should be connected to fi-
nancial institutions’ ICT system for verification.
2. Setting up ICT and institutional infrastructure for fi-
nancial and tax data. Financial institutions and tax au-
thorities must set up ICT infrastructure for financial 
and tax data. Legislation was needed to provide a legal 
basis for requiring financial institutions to intermedi-
ate financial transactions on a real-name basis, includ-
ing penalty provisions for noncompliance. It is criti-
cal to impose the burden of compliance on financial 
institutions so that the use of real names in financial 
transactions is verified in a cost-effective manner. Re-
lated legislation was needed to mandate the use of real 
names in paying taxes, which, in turn, would facilitate 
the introduction of an integrated income tax. 
3. Minimizing the risk of financial turmoil triggered by 
the introduction of RNFTS. Financial transactions cov-
ered by the relevant legislation must be comprehensive 
in scope so the risk of capital flight of uncovered fi-
nancial transactions is minimized. Some measure of 
foreign exchange control may be necessary to prevent 
a capital exodus. The introduction of a RNFTS must 
be well-planned in advance and implemented swiftly 
to minimize transition problems.
4. Addressing public concern about the undue invasion 
of financial privacy. A clear legal provision must be in 
place to prevent public prosecutors and tax authorities 
from abusing their power with regard to real-name fi-
nancial transactions. Such provision must strictly de-
fine conditions under which financial institutions are 
required to provide information to public prosecutors 
and tax authorities. Otherwise, public prosecutors and 
tax authorities would be able to look at any financial 
account and threaten, for instance, to conduct an in-
vestigation into how the account holder has amassed 
the financial assets and might even demand a bribe for 
not conducting such an investigation.
As for the political economy challenges, different types of 
politics are likely to prevail depending on the distribution 
of benefits and costs associated with regulations (Wilson 
1980). In Table 1, Type (1) pits interest groups against each 
other; Types (2) and (3) essentially pit a well-organized 
and highly motivated interest group against the general 
public; and Type (4) pits broad segments of the general 
public against each other. In designing a political economy 
strategy to overcome opposition, these differences must 
be taken into account. In Type (1), concentrated costs 
and concentrated benefits, each side tries to overcome 
well-organized opposition from the other side by building 
alliances and gaining political influence. In Types (2) and 
(3), the main challenge is for one side to mobilize public 
support and overcome well-organized opposition from 
the other side, a vested interest. In Type (4), each side has 
little entrenched interest and attempts to mobilize public 
support for its own position.7
Introducing RNFTS is generally regarded as a case of 
Type (3), concentrated costs and dispersed benefits, where 
5 For a comprehensive discussion of technical and legal issues associated with 
RNFTS, see Ministry of Finance and Economy, Compendium on Real Name 
Financial Transaction System (Seoul: Ministry of Finance and Economy, 1999) 
[in Korean].
6 For a good overview of national identification systems, see ITU-T Focus Group 
Digital Financial Services, Review of National Identity Programs (International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), 2016).
7 For more detail on these ideas, see James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation 
(New York: Basic Books, 1980).
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reform-minded citizens must play entrepreneurial politics 
to mobilize the support of the general public to overcome 
the resistance of the powerful vested interest. However, 
under certain conditions, it may resemble a case of Type (1), 
concentrated costs and concentrated benefits, where a few 
reformers could derive a disproportionate share of benefits 
against their political rivals. In Korea’s case, the payoff 
structure associated with RNFTS seems to have changed 
from Type (3) in the 1980s to Type (1) in 1993.
The implementation of RNFTS in Korea took a 
considerable amount of time—over a decade—and suffered 
multiple setbacks, given the political economy challenge of 
overcoming a well-organized, entrenched opposition, as 
well as the complex technical challenges associated with 
RNFTS. 
Implementation
Attempt to Introduce RNFTS in 1982
Eradicating corruption and tax evasion fostered by a lack 
of transparency in financial transactions represented one 
of the most important development challenges for Korea 
in the early 1980s. Against this background, in 1982, a 
massive financial fraud engineered by the relatives of the 
First Lady (known as the Chang Young-ja case) highlighted 
problems associated with financial transactions on non-
real name basis.8 This created a huge political problem 
for the Chun Doo-hwan government, which had seized 
power through a military coup and tried to shore up its 
legitimacy by promoting economic justice. Even though 
the power elite at the time most likely benefited from the 
lack of financial transparency, they had to do something 
to address popular discontent.
Korea had already established a national identification 
system based on the Resident Registration Law (1962) 
and the resident registration number system (1969).9 
However, it had only partially set up ICT and institutional 
infrastructure for financial and tax data.10 Although there 
was an integrated income tax, financial income was taxed 
at the source, and separately from other types of income, 
because financial transactions frequently took place on a 
non-real-name basis. Financial institutions agreed to hold 
large financial accounts under fictitious or borrowed names 
under the pretext of encouraging savings. Also, there were 
types of securities that could be bought and sold on an 
anonymous basis. To introduce RNFTS, the government 
would have to take proactive measures to deal with the 
remaining technical and political economy challenges. 
Reform-minded government officials, led by the Senior 
Economic Secretary to the President and the Minister 
of Finance, drafted a “Plan to Implement Real-Name 
Transactions and Reform Integrated Income Tax Related 
to Legalizing Curb Loans.” Publicly released on July 3, 
1982, this plan aimed to strengthen the data infrastructure 
by providing tax disincentives and incentives to put 
financial information in real-name terms. Until the end 
of June 1986, it imposed a special penalty of five percent 
on financial assets that were not converted to a real-
name basis by the end of June 1983; and then 50 percent 
8 Chang Young-ja was a younger sister of the wife of the First Lady’s uncle and 
was herself married to a former deputy director of the Korea Central Intelligence 
Agency (KCIA). She assured cash-strapped companies that she could use 
her influence to secure bank loans for them on good terms, in exchange for 
their promissory notes (IOUs) as collateral. Before securing bank loans for 
these companies, she then circulated their promissory notes at a discount and 
pocketed around 140 billion won. Unable to cover their promissory notes, 
a number of companies went bankrupt, including the second largest steel 
company and the eighth largest construction company in Korea at the time.
9 For more detail, see Ji Woong Yoon, Ho Kyu Lee, and Chan Mi Chu, The 
Evolution of the Resident Registration System in Korea (Sejong and Seoul: 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance and Kyunghee University, 2015).
10 Korea’s National Backbone Information System Project, launched in 1983, 
consisted of building five fundamental data networks: administration, 
finance, education and research, national defense, and public security. The 
implementation of the Project started in 1987, with the computerization of 
financial, tax, and other information anchored on the resident registration 
number.
Table 1. Types of Politics Based on the Payoff Structure of the Regulation
Costs of Regulation
Concentrated Dispersed
Benefits of 
Regulation
Concentrated (1)  Interest group politics 
(e .g ., Group A vs . Group B in standard-setting)
(2)  Client politics  
(e .g ., restricting competition)
Dispersed (3)  Entrepreneurial politics  
(e .g ., restricting tobacco sales)
(4)  Majoritarian politics  
(e .g ., choosing between new flag 
designs in New Zealand)
Source: Re-cited from Lim (2017), p .156, based on Wilson (1980) .
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of the interest income over the next three years after that 
month. To make the transition to an integrated income 
tax system more palatable, the top rate for the integrated 
income tax was reduced. 
In addition, to minimize the risk of financial turmoil, the 
plan set the scope of real name transactions to cover almost 
all financial transactions and introduced complementary 
measures to curb speculation in the real estate market. 
Pre-existing measures of foreign exchange control were 
deemed sufficient to prevent a capital exodus. To minimize 
transition problems, the deadline for adopting real name 
transactions was set at January 1, 1983 for new financial 
accounts, and July 1, 1983 for existing accounts.
By contrast, few measures were adopted to safeguard 
financial privacy. Last but not least, little thought was 
given to political economy challenges. Not much effort 
was made to mobilize the support of the general public 
and weaken the resistance of vested interests, including 
powerful politicians and business people who had the 
most to lose after the introduction of RNFTS. Perhaps 
the technocrats who drafted the implementation plan 
under Chun Doo-hwan’s direction wanted to minimize 
the potential for conflict with powerful politicians and 
business people in case Chun later withdrew his support. 
The result was all too predictable. On July 13, 1982, one 
of the pseudo-opposition parties11 at the time called for 
the suspension of the government’s plan. Its grounds for 
objection included the lack of prior consultation with the 
National Assembly, the potential unconstitutionality of 
public investigations on the source of funds in anonymous 
or fictitious-name accounts, and insufficient preparation 
for the implementation of integrated income tax. Two 
days later, the Secretary-General of the ruling party 
emphasized in his press interview that not disclosing 
one’s assets was regarded as a virtue in Korean tradition, 
because of modesty about wealth and a desire not to attract 
undue attention from others. Other powerful figures 
in the ruling party soon joined the chorus of negative 
comments on RNFTS. The reform-minded technocrats 
who had drafted the plan were eventually isolated.12
On October 22, 1982, the ruling party introduced an 
alternative legislative bill to postpone the introduction 
of the real name financial transaction system till 
January 1, 1986, or later by a Presidential Decree, based 
on administrative preparedness (e.g., computerization) 
and economic conditions. Until then, a higher tax rate 
would be imposed on non-real-name financial income. 
On the last day of 1982, the National Assembly passed 
this legislation, entitled “Law on Real Name Financial 
Transactions.” 
Attempt to Implement RNFTS in 
1988–1990
Although the plan to introduce RNFTS was suspended 
in 1982, it increasingly became a symbol among reform-
minded experts and technocrats of fundamental 
economic reform to eradicate corruption and tax 
evasion. After free and competitive democratic elections 
were restored in 1987, all major presidential candidates 
pledged to implement RNFTS, including the ruling 
party candidate Roh Tae-woo, a former military general 
who subsequently won the presidential election against 
a divided opposition.13 On October 14, 1988, the Roh 
Tae-woo government announced that it would first 
computerize land records and introduce integrated land 
tax and then implement RNFTS in 1991. In April 1989, 
the government launched a task force to prepare for the 
implementation of real-name financial transactions.
By this time, technical challenges for implementing 
RNFTS had become much less significant compared 
with 1982. In addition to the well-functioning national 
identification system, the infrastructure for financial and 
tax data had become much stronger. Since 1984, financial 
income data had been computerized. Also, the use of real 
names in financial transactions had increased sharply, 
largely due to different tax rates applied to real- and non-
real-name accounts.14 On the number of accounts basis, 
the share of real-name bank accounts had increased 
11 Chun Doo-hwan had seized power through a military coup and banned 
prominent pro-democracy politicians from engaging in politics. For instance, 
Kim Dae-jung was exiled, and Kim Young-sam was put under house arrest. As 
a result, what constituted “the opposition” at this time consisted of politicians 
who largely conformed to the ruling party line.
12 Kang Kyung-sik, the Finance Minister who had drafted the plan in 1982, later 
acknowledged in an interview that he had been too naive. He said that RNFTS 
required “a revolution-like approach.” See Jang-gyu Lee, You’re the President 
for the Economy: A Secret Economic History of the Chun Doo-hwan Era (Seoul: 
Joong-Ang Daily, 1991) [in Korean], pp.180–181.
13 In December 1987, the pro-democracy forces were divided between two well-
known candidates, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. They each received around 
27 percent of the votes, and Roh Tae-woo won the election with a plurality of 
37 percent, because there were no runoff elections under the first-past-the-post 
system for a single-term five-year presidency. The opposition parties, however, 
won a combined majority of the seats in National Assembly elections in April 
1988. After political realignment in the ensuing years, Kim Young-sam and Kim 
Dae-jung won the presidential election in 1992 and 1997, respectively.
14 While the tax rate on interest and dividend income accruing to real name 
financial accounts was held at 10 percent, the corresponding tax rate for non-
real name financial accounts was increased from 15 percent in July 1983, to 
20 percent in January 1985, and then to 40 percent in January 1989.
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from 76.5 percent in June 1983 to 97.8 percent in March 
1989. Over the same period, the corresponding figure for 
securities accounts had increased from 41.0 percent to 
98.6 percent.15
Although the data infrastructure had improved by 
a great deal since 1982, other challenges were less 
effectively addressed. The Roh Tae-woo government 
tried to address popular discontent about real estate 
price escalation by computerizing land records and 
introducing integrated land tax before adopting RNFTS. 
However, this gave vested interests more than two years 
to mobilize opposition. Little thought was given to 
political economy challenges, much as in 1982. 
In the end, a three-party merger to create a dominant 
ruling party sank the reform effort in January 1990. A 
former military general (Roh Tae-woo) joined forces 
with a pro-democracy politician (Kim Young-sam) 
and a conservative politician (Kim Jong Pil) to create a 
supermajority party, isolating another pro-democracy 
politician (Kim Dae-jung).16 At the time, politicians may 
have shared a common interest in keeping financial 
transactions on confidential basis so as to complete the 
three-party merger.17 In April 1990, a new economic team 
brought in after the merger announced that the government 
would indefinitely suspend the implementation of RNFTS. 
Successful Implementation of RNFTS in 
1993
Although the introduction of RNFTS had been 
suspended yet again in 1990, the data infrastructure 
for its implementation was largely already in place. 
In addition, massive corruption cases involving high-
ranking government officials and politicians highlighted 
the need to strengthen financial transparency. Public 
support for RNFTS grew as a result. Prior to the 1992 
presidential election, all political parties pledged to 
implement RNFTS. This was endorsed by the Federation 
of Korean Industrialists (FKI), some of whom had become 
openly critical of politicians for demanding “slush funds,” 
confidential payments for which business favors in return 
became increasingly uncertain.18
These were significant developments in political 
economy terms, because they meant that public support 
for RNFTS could be more effectively mobilized compared 
with 1982 or 1988–1990. Non-government organizations 
such as Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) 
called for the implementation of RNFTS. FKI, for its own 
reasons, also supported the introduction of RNFTS.
Another significant development in political economy 
terms was the election of Kim Young-sam as the President 
in December 1992, the prominent opposition leader 
who had joined forces with military and conservative 
elements in the three-party merger. As the leader of the 
pro-democracy minority faction within the supermajority 
ruling party, he set to work to weaken the political influence 
of the military, not only to increase his power within the 
ruling party but also to establish full-fledged civilian rule in 
democratized Korea. To a large extent, his private interest 
as a real-life politician coincided with the public interest, 
because RNFTS would potentially shed light on the secret 
financial dealings of his political rivals in the course of 
public prosecution against corruption. In this respect, the 
incentives facing Kim Young-sam were different from those 
facing Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, the two former 
military generals who had built up enormous slush funds 
to maintain their political influence and were opposed to a 
full-fledged implementation of RNFTS. 
As soon as he took office in February 1993, Kim 
Young-sam broke up a secret military clique (Hanahoi) 
that had backed the earlier authoritarian regime. Hanahoi 
had been founded by Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, 
and their classmates at the Korea Military Academy, 
and maintained a great deal of influence in the military. 
Kim also directed all high-ranking officials to register 
and publicly disclose their assets. This demonstrated to 
the public that some high-ranking officials had enriched 
themselves through questionable means, highlighting the 
need to enhance financial transparency.
Kim Young-sam regarded RNFTS as an instrument 
to have all citizens register their assets. In particular, he 
had a strong interest in having his political rivals conduct 
financial transactions on a real-name basis so that they 
15 On the amount of financial assets basis, the share of non-real name accounts 
must have been much higher, even though it was not disclosed.
16 Although Kim Young-sam was widely criticized for joining forces with the 
remnants of the military government, according to his accounts, he believed 
that a divided opposition would again hand the presidency to a former military 
general in the next election; to catch a tiger, he felt, he had to go into the tiger’s 
den. For a more detailed discussion of politics in Korea from 1987 to 1997, see 
Eichengreen, Lim, Park, and Perkins (2015), pp.28–36.
17 Later, it was discovered that Roh Tae-woo had provided political funds to not 
only Kim Young-sam and Kim Jong-pil but also Kim Dae-jung as well.
18 As the Korean economy was liberalized, in part due to pressure from its trading 
partners, it became increasingly difficult for the government to hold on to 
the levers of control and distribute favors. At the same time, due to political 
liberalization, politics became more competitive and politicians demanded 
more money for campaign financing.
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would have difficulty collecting and managing their 
“slush funds.” 
On June 29, 1993, he directed the Deputy Prime 
Minister to prepare an implementation plan for RNFTS 
and maintain utmost confidentiality throughout the 
process. The President left out of the loop his Senior 
Economic Secretary, who had expressed reservations 
about RNFTS. The Deputy Prime Minister organized a 
task force consisting of key members from the Office of 
Taxation at the Ministry of Finance and senior fellows 
from the Korea Development Institute (KDI). Drawing 
lessons from the failed efforts in 1982 and 1988–90, 
the task force worked around the clock to draft the 
implementation plan. Whenever the task force presented 
multiple options to President Kim, he always chose the 
strongest option.19
At the same time, to safeguard financial privacy, he 
approved the inclusion of strict procedural rules for 
official information requests on financial transactions. 
In particular, the new procedural rules stipulated that 
public authorities must make official information 
requests in writing to particular branches of financial 
institutions, rather than financial institutions at large. The 
written document must include the name of the person 
concerned, intended use of the information, and content 
of the requested information on financial transactions. 
The rules also mandated financial institutions to refuse to 
provide information if an unlawful request was received.
On August 12, 1993, President Kim Young-sam declared 
that he would immediately implement RNFTS and issued 
a Presidential Emergency Order at the suggestion of 
KDI fellows, without prior approval from the National 
Assembly. He took this action primarily because of his 
concern about the negative effect of protracted debates 
in the National Assembly.20
Given the failed legislative efforts in 1982 and 1988–1990, 
President Kim’s implementation strategy is understandable. 
It was also effective in implementing RNFTS without 
a setback. However, this does not mean that issuing a 
Presidential Emergency Order was the only way to ensure 
a successful implementation of RNFTS. With increased 
public support for RNFTS and enhanced technical/
administrative preparedness, it was likely a matter of time 
before RNFTS could be introduced by legislation. In fact, 
Korea did not always resort to extraordinary measures 
with regard to financial integrity. In 1997, the National 
Assembly replaced the 1993 Presidential Emergency Order 
with the Act on Real Name Financial Transactions and 
Confidentiality. And again, through regular legislative 
channels, in 2014 the National Assembly amended this Act 
to prohibit borrowed-name financial transactions.21
Conclusion and Lessons 
Learned
The three separate attempts to implement RNFTS in 
Korea show that it was critical to address two types of 
delivery challenge: technical and political. 
The first technical challenge for RNFTS was setting up 
identification systems for individuals and legal entities. 
Since 1969, Korea had a well-established national 
identification system based on the resident registration 
number; however, in a number of developing countries it 
remains a challenge to set up such a national identification 
system.
The second technical challenge was setting up ICT 
and institutional infrastructure for financial and tax data. 
Since 1983, Korea progressively computerized financial 
and tax data in the 1980s and increased the share of real-
name financial transactions by applying lower tax rates to 
real-name accounts. 
The third technical challenge was minimizing the 
risk of a financial turmoil triggered by the introduction 
of RNFTS. The Presidential Emergency Order of 1993 
had a comprehensive scope with very few exceptions 
so that the risk of capital flight of uncovered financial 
transactions was minimized. Drawing lessons from the 
failed attempts in 1982 and 1988–90, the implementation 
plan was well conceived and put into effect swiftly to 
minimize transition problems.
The fourth technical challenge was addressing public 
concern about undue invasion of financial privacy. The 
19 Author’s interview with Soogil Young on August 10, 2018. See also Soogil 
Young, “Korea’s Financial Reform: Reshaping Society,” International Economic 
Insights 5(1), January/February 1994: 42–44 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics).
20 According to Article 76 of the Constitution, after issuing a Presidential 
Emergency Order, the President must promptly report to the National 
Assembly and obtain its approval. Kim Young-sam made RNFTS a fait 
accompli and prevailed upon the National Assembly to approve the Presidential 
Emergency Order by raising the specter of financial chaos and confusion that 
would ensue if the Order was disapproved. Drawing lessons from the failed 
attempts to implement RNFTS in 1982 and 1988–1990, Kim Young-sam felt 
that it would be best to avoid protracted debates in the National Assembly 
before implementation.
21 However, this amendment has penalty provisions for borrowed name 
transactions connected with illegal activities only (e.g., smuggling).
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1993 Presidential Emergency Order introduced new 
procedural rules for official information requests on 
financial transactions and mandated financial institution 
to refuse to provide information if they receive an unlawful 
request. It is important to strike a balance between 
enhancing financial integrity and safeguarding financial 
privacy. Policymakers should not only set up an effective 
ICT infrastructure for financial and tax data but also 
address public concern about privacy by establishing strict 
procedural rules.
As for the political economy challenge, it was important 
to mobilize public support and weaken the resistance of 
vested interests through prior reform measures. By the late 
1980s, technical challenges had been largely overcome, but 
political economy challenges remained in Korea. It took 
the change of government (military-civilian transition) 
and decisive leadership of President Kim Young-sam to 
overcome this hurdle in 1993. Prior to the announcement 
of the Presidential Emergency Order in August 1993, he 
disbanded a secret military clique (Hanahoi) and mandated 
the public disclosure of high-ranking officials’ assets. When 
the benefits of a reform are dispersed but its costs are 
concentrated, reformers may engage in “entrepreneurial 
politics” to raise public awareness of the issues and appeal 
to politicians who could benefit from such a reform.
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